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I. Fashioning international frameworks lo de ai with the processes and 
tensions unleashed by the collapse of communism would be no easy task in 
even the besl af circumstances. Transfonnations throughout the post-commu-
nist world continue al a brealhtaking speed. After years of enforeed stabilily 
wilhin a rigid constellation. we have entered a period of uncertainty and a 
difficult, protracted seareh for new stability. 
Given lhe rapid pace of developrnents, any aeeount of the current Euro-
pean seeurily agenda from the perspective 01' East Cenlral Europe will scem 
provisional, subject to further and further revisions. Wilh lhis caveat declared. 
I will proceed in this paper to consider, firs!' lhe purported lhreals and risks to 
European security loday; then move on to survey the plaee Central Europe 
wants lo eSlablish for itself in the emerging European seeurity slruelure (which 
should consist ar several building blocks of «interlocking» institutions -
OSCE. NATO. WET). I will conelude with a eouple 01' remarks concerning the 
current debale on NATO expansion. ln geographic term,. I wiU concentrate on 
rour Cenlral European counlries - the Czech Republic, Hungary. Poland, 
Slovakia - and only secondary consider the Balkans. and states emerging from 
the former Soviet Union that constitute the rest of formerly communist Eastem 
Europe. 
_.2. The faU of the Soviel Empire has undeniably opened lhe way to a new 
seeurity agenda, differenl from the one that dominated lhe deeades marked by 
Europe's division into ideologicaUy polarized blocks. Seemingly overnighl, lhat 
division disappeared and lhe hope for European unification rose. Ali of the new 
regimes in the former communist bloc declared their commitment to the values 
af parliarnenlary dcrnacracy and lhe rule 01' law. the European division and 
confrontation gave way to cooperation and ideological homogeneity. 
ln lhe rall of 1990, when the Charter for lhe New Europe was solemnly 
signed in Paris by ali member-states of CSCE, lhe sky was blue over the «old» 
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continen!. The magnificent vision of pan-European integration, the vision of 
confederated Europe, which is «no more the conglomeration of different 
nations influencing one another only through commerce and power struggle» 
(to use the phrasing of Edmund Husserl, one of the great Europeans of this 
century) ('), bUl the organic unity of peoples connected above ali by the shared 
politicaI culture, respecting in ali their differences the sarne principIes of 
politicaI behaviour, seemed to be more realizable than ever before, 
Six years later, however, it is more than obvious that the end of East-West 
antagonism also had another effecl The expected hannonious progress of 
Europe towards new intemational order founded on rule of law and elementary 
European values has not materialized and a number of problems resurfaced, 
Idealism dominating the politicaI discourse after the collapse of communism 
has faded away and realism reasserted itself in European intemational arena. 
Not only the East has been thrown into the flux by the sudden reopening of the 
societies tha! were c10sed for decades, The cohesion of Westem Europe has also 
been undergoing a trial that is perhaps more severe and decisive than any - even 
that posed by the Soviet threat - over the previous 45 years, The resolution of 
the ideological conflict between East and West, (which entailed the end of the 
Cold War, and the disintegration of the «socialist camp», that culminated in the 
split of the Soviet Union), is surely not only a European affair. It is without any 
doubt the major politicaI event in the second half of 20th century, which has an 
immense dynamizing effect also in the other parts of the world. 
Paradoxically, the disappearance of the worldwide struggle between East 
and West, behind which always lays the possibility of global nuclear conflict, 
has led to a decreased degree of stability. For ali the deserved enthusiasm about 
the passing of communism, one elementary truth of power politics should not 
be overIooked: The ideologically competi tive bipolar system, in which the 
major powers were alert to any risk of erasion of their position that might result 
fram disorder anywhere - the paliem that prevailed in Europe far more than 
four decades of cold war - was incomparably more stable and (at least in 
Eurape) more peaceful than a system of the sart we see emerging now, in which 
no major power sees its vital interests in jeopardy in conflict situations almost 
everywhere. 
Whereas the politicaI architecture in Europe was stabilized by its symme-
try during the decades of the ideological confrontation of the Cold War, the 
main characteristic of the current situation in Europe is complex asymmetry 
(I) Til! Vienna Lecture. 
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and tension between two opposite trends dominating the politicaI processes in 
the West and in the East: integration and fragmentation. 
ln a dramatic reversal of cold war security thinking, there is security 
agenda for countries without any elear and identifiable military enemy. lnstead 
of scenarios of mililary threats Ihal defined security in the cold war, the currem 
security situation in Central Europe is defined by a variety of risks, often of a 
complex nature. The danger lies in the possible conjunction of various risk 
factors, mutually reinforcing each other and cumulatively jeopardizing peace 
and security in the region. 
What also has to be eonsidered in our current security deliberations is the 
growing importanee of transnational faetors, which do not respeet the state 
borders and are not under the control of the governments exerting the sovereign 
power aTI their territories. Revolutionary changes in communications and 
computer technology, the growth of an integrated global market have weakened 
as a malter of fact the position and role of nation-state in the evolution of 
international system. It enables freer trade in «bads» as well as in «goods» and 
makes intemational crime more significant factor in international relations than 
ever before. Because territorial nation-states are more opeo and penetrable now 
than ever before, any «national» security doctrine or formula cannot atTord to 
ignore the problem of global governance and not to respect the fundamental 
guidelines of global security policy: 
«The primary goals of global security policy should be to prevent conflict 
and war and to maintain the inlegrity of the environment and life-support 
systems of the planet by eliminating the cconomic, social environmental 
politicai and military conditions and gene rate threats to the security of people 
and the planet, and by anticipating and managing crises before they escalate 
into armed conllicts» ('). 
3. Among all four Central European countries - the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia - there is agreement that the new security 
agenda must deal wilh the whole series of ongoing and nascent eonflicls that 
undermine the region's peaee and tranquillity. 
Nane af these countries identifies any canerete externa1 enemy in their 
defenee stralegies. nevertheless it is clearly perceived in all of them, that the 
unstable zone where threats and difficulties mighl come at some poim in future 
is situated in Easl. Uncertain developments in Russia, Ukraine and other newly 
(") Our Global Neighborhood, Oxford University Press 1995. p. 338. 
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emerging democracies on lhe lerrilory of lhe former Soviel Union, lurmoils and 
crises accompanying their «transitions» from communism, risk af revi vai af 
Russian imperialism, represenl lhe mos I frequenlly used argumenls, why 
Central Europe feels lhe need of fasl and tirm anchoring in lhe securily syslem 
01' the Wes!. ln spite 01' the fact that there does not seem to be an imminenl 
danger of a forceful reassertion of Russian hegemony in this part of Europe, lhe 
future af Russia, as lhe Central European politieians and seeurily analysts 
repeal again and again, remains unclear. Even if Russia itself should be 
slabilized, there is no guaranlee of slability for the countries on its periphery 
- ando indeed, there is some evidence lhat sorne forces within Russia might n01 
only welcome, bul malevolenlly aggravate, such instability to ereate an opening 
af reassertion of Russian domination. 
The OIher area posing risks to regional securily is the Balkans, especially 
lhe formerYugoslavia, which has made itself a shorthand place name for a large 
apparent risk in lhe region - a seemingly uncontrolled wavc af aggressive 
nationalism, inter-ethnic disputes and conllicls. oppression af minorities. and 
religious intolerance, Ali these phcnomena have manifested themsclves to some 
degree practically everywhere in the eastern part of the continent. The frustra-
tions 01' lhe post-communiSl environment provide fertile soi I for them. Al-
though Ihey are latently present in any society, what makes them especially 
daogerous and viruleot in the EasL is lhe weakness of the politicai system and 
shock of economic hardship, whieh lempt demagogieal politicai leaders to base 
their polilical slrategies 00 searching for scapegoals aod cnemies. internal and 
external. 
Thcre is no doubt that whal should be blamed in lhe tirst plaee for lhe 
explosion of post-totalitarian violence is nationalism and virulent reemergence 
01' elhnicity in the destabilized regions 01' East Central Europe, Nevertheless, iI 
must he clearly admittcd lhat ncw nationalist do not operate in vacuum and that 
lhe rcason why they eventually could succeed must be soughl also in the 
general habits and practices of European «Realpolitik» which made its come-
-baek atier the short period 01' idealistic enthusiasm, The unprecedented 
Bosnian debacle is detinitely not a disaslrous product 01' ethnie principie which 
made its come-back in many parts 01' East Central Europe after the eollapse of 
communist ideology, but «the grcatcst collcctive sccurity failure of lhe West 
since the 1930», as one hight-ranked U,S, ofrieial put iI recently, The "Yugo-
slav virus». to use Adam Michnik' words, nol ooly has caused the deaths af 
lhausands of innocent people in the territories hit hy lhe epidemies. bUl is 
effe.ctivc aba outside lhe killing zone. It demonslrales inabilily 01' Europcans 
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to act in concert in such a new situation, it reveals not anly how inefficient are 
the existing institutions and mechanisms when confronted with such a crisis but 
also how precarious and uncertain are even the eoncepts and ideas which are 
supposed to give us a clear and undistorted pieture of whats is going on and 
make us capable of understanding. The recem American diplomatic initiative 
resulting in Dayton Agreements finally stopped the deadly war. Nevertheless, 
the results of the peace process and its impact on the future Eurapean 
developments still remain to be seen. 
The way how Western Europe reaeted to the Yugoslav crisis reminded us 
clearly that there may be also some risk factors originating here to be taken imo 
consideration: inability of Western European countries to abandon their na-
tional policies in lhe maments of erisis and to «aet in concert»; possibility af 
economic recession resulting in increased protectionism and reluctance to 
proceed quickly enough with the reintegration 01' post-communist countries; 
possible growth of intluence of extremist elements in the Western societies; 
tensions and eruptions created by inability 01' Europe to absorb the steady 
slream 01' immigrants from the developing world; endemic contlict between 
post-modem European civilization and religious fundamentalÍsm gaining strength 
particularly in many Islam countries. These risks obviously cannol be COITI-
pared to those irradiating fram the Easl. but lO see them and count on them is 
not a kind 01' Cassandra's prophecy but rather a sound realistic advice for those 
who want to «rclurn» to Europe. 
It is evident thal. in the aftermath of the disintegration 01' the Soviet bloc. 
East Central Eurape now finds itsel r in a dramatically ncw geopolilieal and 
geostrategic silualion. sandwiched belween lhe stable and prosperous West on 
one side and the vast, destabilized areas of the East, whose politicai and 
economic problems differ qualitatively fram the hardships af transition thraugh 
whieh East Central Europe is passing. As lhey continue to seek new relation-
ships that would provi de lhem Wilh a satisfactory assurance of security, the East 
Central European countries still are suspended in strategic uncertainty. some-
times incorrcctly referred 10 as a security vacuum. For sure, the devclopments 
of their relationships to both thcir eastern and westner neighbors is a process 
evolving over lime. Nevertheless. ali lhese slates c1early have one basic 
strategic objective: They want to be neither «neutral» so Jong as Western 
neighbors sec continucd utility in a common alliance, nor component of the 
Wesl's buffer zone. Ralher, lhey would Iike to be full-tledged members 01' a 
European security system, no malter how thal system will be defined. 
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4. All the cauntries af East Central Europe put much hope in the further 
development of institutional links with established security organizations of 
Westem Europe. The reason, they are so emphatic about their need to be 
integrated as much as possible with the Wcst, and especially to obtain from it 
some security guarantecs as sooo as possible. reí1ects not only their evaluation 
of possible future threats. but also their experience in the past, sitting for 
decades 00 lhe wrong side af the barricade. That is why their views are 50 
different from those of the countries lhat were neutral in the cold war. such as 
Austria and Finland, which in many respeets would seem to face similar 
security concems. On lhis. domeslic politicai factors play the crucial role - in 
lhe way post-communist societies perceive their situation. and in the need af 
policymakers and politicians in these countries to be able to justify their 
positions to their publics. 
It has been said many times that from lhe poinl of view of Central 
European countries aTI aptimum security structure in Europc should bc bascd 
00 the broad concept Df security embracing politicai, economic and defence 
components and consisl af several «interlocking» and «mutually reinforcing» 
institutions, namely NATO, EU and OSCE. This is also the reason why all of 
lhem consider the fulI membership in NATO .nd EU as lheir vital interest and 
lhe most importan! objective 01' their foreign policies. I canno! go here into a 
de!ailed discussion of alI building blocks of the emerging security sy'tem. I 
would likc to conclude with several remarks concerning thc securily debate 
which is now very popu lar in Central Europe: lhe debate on the NATO 
enlargement. 
The repor! on enlargement unveiled in September 1995 by the former 
NATO's Secretary General Willy Claes explains clearly the current posilian af 
lhe Alliance: 
«NATO invites othcr European countries to becomc AlIies» as «further 
step towards lhe Alliance's hasic goal 01' enhancing security and stability 
throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. within the context Df a broad European 
security architecture. Thc NATO enlargement will extend to ncw members the 
benefits of common defence and integralion inta European and Air-Atlantic 
institutions» (par. 2). 
«Enlargement should accord with, and help promote. the purposes and 
principies of the Charler 01' lhe United Nalions, and the safcguarding of the 
frecdom, common heritage and civilizatian 01' ali Alliance mcmbcrs am! thcir 
people, founded an the principies of democraey, individual liberty "nd the rule 
of law. New memhers will necd lO conform lo lhese basic principies» (par. 4). 
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If the admission of new members was really dependent on their conformity 
with above mentioned principies, on their wildness to join lhe Atlantic commu-
nity and readiness to meet ali criteria mentioned in the Study, it would be 
possible lo expect that they would be in prctty soon, The situation, however, is 
not that easy and unambiguous, The document also states: 
«Decision on enlargement will be for NATO itself. Enlargement will occur 
through a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process, encompassing dialogue 
with ali interested parties, There is no fixed and rigid list of criteria for inviting 
new member states to join Alliance, Enlargement will be decided on a case-by-
-case-basis and some nations may attain membership befare othem> (paL 7)", 
«Stability and security in Europe will be strengthened through an evolutionary 
process, taking into account politicai and security developments in the whole 
of Europe» (par, II), 
«NATO-Russia relations should re/lect Russia's significance in Europe 
security and be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence, no 
surprise decisions by eilher side whieh could affect the interests of the otheL 
This relationship can only /lourish if it is rooted in strict eompliance wilh 
international commitments and obligations. such as those under the UN 
Charter, the OSCE, including the Code of Conduct and the CFE Treaty, and full 
respeet for the sovereignty of other independent stales. NATO decision. 
however, cannol be subject to any veto or droir de regard by a non-member 
statc. nor can Alliance be subordinated to anothcr European security institu-
tiom> (paL 27). 
These formulas indicale c1early what is the security puzzle the NATO 
policy planners are solving: how to design and realize a ncw security system 
in which NATO apparently has to play the central role and not to divide Europe 
again into to hostile military blocks: how to build a new European security 
architecture and «not to antagonize Russians»). North Atlantic Trcaty Coopera-
tion Council (NACC) created at the Rome summit 01' NATO in 1991 and The 
Partnership for Peace proposal adopted in Brussels in January of 1994 have 
been the way how to implement the evolutionary strategy. The Study on NATO 
enlargement published in a mament when the individual partnership programs 
are alrcady on their way represent lhe third step. 
What is warning, however, from the point of view af Central Europeans. 
is that in spite af a11 promising formlllations most of fundamental questions 
concerning future security arrangcments in Europc remain unanswcred, that 
whole security debate in Europe has been dominated by the following unspo-
ken assumptions: 
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• That it is up to the West to chose just how many ar how few of lhe Easl 
Europeans can be included in its instilutions; 
• That the former communist countries are likely to be more of a burden 
rather than advantage for the Alliance; 
• That is possible to appease the Russians and satisfy the needs of the East 
Europeans at the sarne time and, finally; 
• That caution in this enterprise, moving slowly and gradually on NATO' 
enlargement, is beneficial for European security ('). 
The Central European countries are without any doubt interested in having 
good, stable and mutually beneficiary relationships with the Russian Federation 
and recognize that Russia as one global superpowers having on its disposal 
nuclear arms has an important contribution to make to European stability and 
security. They are aware that for the West Russia is a strategic partner of first 
rale. On the other hand, they do not want to be condemned to passivity in the 
politicai processes in which also their security and future perspectives are 
decided, and to wait-and-see position. They firmly believe that in spite of the 
Russian negative attitude and more and more open signals coming from Moscow 
indicating that any concrete step towards the enlargement would be interpreted 
as a hostile act and beginning of the new round of the cold war in Europe. there 
is no alternative to the enIargement af NATO; that a cone rele decision' «when 
and how» NATO will expand should be made as soon as possible. Such a move 
would be, actually, in the security interests of Russia itself. The security limbo 
and uncertainties in Central Europe can only complicate the Kremlin's calcula-
tions to and indefinite degree and efticiently block the emergence of a new. for 
ali European countries desiderable security structure. 
01' course, the Central European countries should be and in fact they are, 
patient, as regards their particular security concems. And they should not push 
too hard seeing their own national interests only and jeopardizing overall 
European security developments. On the other hand, it is perfectly clear why 
the Study on NATO enlargement defining on general levei ali principies, 
criteria and conditionalities of this move should be followed, in foreseeable 
future, by next steps and concrete enlargement decision. 
Martin Pa/ous 
(') The arguments presenred here are borrowed from a discussion pap~r of Jonathan Eyal. 
presented at lhe conference 01\ the fUlUre of European security held in Prague in October 1995. 
132 
